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IGNORANCE OF THE LAW: A MAXIM REEXAMINED
RONALD

A. CAss*

Over the past 20 years the Supreme Court has expanded several doctrines that limit legislators' ability to make conduct criminal.' The Court
has adopted these limitations, however, while reaffirming the validity
of decisions rendered over the preceding 40 years that eschewed certain
traditional restrictions on legislative power to declare actions criminal.'
These decisions have spawned commentary attacking or supporting
nearly every facet of the law that controls when and how criminal liability may be assessed.3 Through the decisions, dissents and discourses,
however, one Latin maxim, ignorantia legis neminem excusat,4 has escaped almost unscathed. Most commentators admit that some injustice

results from the application of this maxim,5 and both the expansion and
contraction of limitations on legislative freedom to criminalize have
undermined the theoretical bases of the maxim. Nonetheless, the doc*B.A., University of Virginia; J.D., University of Chicago. Associate member, Arent,
Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D. C.
1. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (void-for-vagueness); Gregory v.
Chicago, 394 U.S. 476 (1957) (freedom of speech).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (no due process objection
to indictment failing to allege mens rea); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S.
57 (1910) (intent not essential element of crime). But see Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246 (1952).
3. See, e.g., Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CoRNEM. L.Q.
195 (1955); Hippard, The Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault:
An Argunent for a Constitutional Doctrine of Mens Rea, 10 HousToN L. REv. 1039
(1973); Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 145; Note,
The Void-for-Vaguenss Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rxv. 67 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine]; 53 MicH.'L. REv. 264 (1954).
4. Sometimes also given as ignorantia juris non excusat, e.g., Keedy, Ignorance and
Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARv. L. REv. 75, 77 (1908), the maxim declares that
ignorance of the law excuses no one (neminem excusat) or simply does not excuse
(non excusat). The maxim will be referred to hereinafter as ignwrantia legis.
5. See, e.g., J. Hall, Ignorance md Mistake in Criminal Lawy, 33 IND. LJ. 1, 36-37
(1957); L. Hall & Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. Cam. L. REv. 641,
648-51 (1941); Hart, The Aims of the Crhiinal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401,
419 (1958); Hughes, Crinzinal Omissions, 67 YALE LJ. 590, 600-02 (1958); Packer, supra
note 3, at 145. The authors differ as to where the line should be drawn separating
just from unjust application of the doctrine, but they agree that the greatest problems
arise when the maxim is applied to crimes of omission, see Hughes, supra, to crimes
that are nzala prohibita, see Hart, supra at 420-21, or to crimes not contrary to moral
conscience, see J. Hall, supra at 35-36.
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trine continues to be applied, and judges and authors find justification
for the ability of the doctrine to enjoy a vigorous old age.'
This Article, after examining the distinctions between ignorantialegis
and related doctrines, will review decisions that consider whether ignorance should be permitted to excuse. The present health of the maxim, it
will be shown, is artificially induced: only a small kernel of logic lies inside this large and illogical doctrine, and if deprived of the unquestioning
adherence to which it owes its present form, ignorantialegis might pass
away without harm to law enforcement and with considerable benefit
to the harmony of the criminal law.
VAGUENESS,

INTENT, AND IGNORANCE:

A

DOCTRINAL JUNGLE

The Supreme Court has relied on several distinct doctrines to limit
the extent to which legislatures constitutionally may make activities
criminal. Unfortunately, the Court often has blurred the distinctions
between these limitations, 7 and occasionally has suggested that legislative compliance with the requirements of some doctrines may obviate
the need for compliance with others.8 This doctrinal blending has not
produced new "combination" restraints on legislative action, however,
for the Court has not shown fidelity to its intermingling of doctrines. 9
Instead, the Court has rendered more difficult the tasks of separating,
analyzing, and applying the different restrictions. It may be helpful,
therefore, to trace briefly the relevant doctrines used by the Court, attempting to distinguish them from one another before turning to the
merits of ignorantialegis.
Certain restrictions on the criminalizing power of the legislature are
set forth expressly in the Constitution. The prohibition of ex post facto
6. See, e.g., United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563
(1971); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. '225, 228 (1957); Shcvlin-Carpenter Co. v.
Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910); United States v. Fhrlichman, No. 74-1882 (D.C. Cir.,
May 17, 1976), slip op. at 20-21; J. Hall, supra note 5, at 23-44; Keedy, supra note 4,
at 91; Perkins, Ignorance arnd Mistake in Crhninal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35, 40-41
(1939).
7. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1957) (ignorantia legis and
notice); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-12 (1948) (void-for-vagueness and
freedom of speech). See notes 14-17, 77-78 infra & accompanying text.
8. Courts may accept a requirement of scienter, willfullness, or bad faith, for example, as a "substitute" for definiteness in a criminal statute that would otherwise be
voided as overly vague. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 3, at 87 n.98. See, e.g.,

Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1952); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-03 (1945).
text.

See also notes 29-33 infra & accompanying

9. See notes 16-17, 29-38 infra & accompanying text.

19761

IGNORANCE OF LAW

laws' ° and the declaration included in the first amendment that Congress
shall make no laws abridging the freedom of speech are obvious examples. The Court has had little trouble achieving a conceptual consensus
regarding such express restrictions; differences have arisen, for example,
not over the permissibility of preventing free speech but rather over the
definition of protected speech" and over the breadth of legitimate
"peace-keeping" regulation of speech that may be said to fall short
12
of abridgment.
In recent years the Court increasingly has faced challenges to criminal
laws alleged to be overbroad under the first amendment. The doctrine of
overbreadth is applied to invalidate statutes that may be read to proscribe
both activities that are protected by the first amendment and actions that
constitutionally may be forbidden. Because the Court has recognized
that overbreadth is related closely to the void-for-vagueness doctrine,"a
which requires criminal statutes to be explicit, these doctrines are a point
of contact between express constitutional limitations on legislative power
and limitations grounded in due process requirements. The most significant applications of vagueness have been in cases involving alleged infringement of first amendment rights;' 4 some opinions have suggested
that the doctrine imposes higher requirements if a statute impinges on
expression protected by the first amendment than if the legislation regulates economic activity. 5 Although the Court recently declared that
overbreadth and vagueness are separate doctrines,'0 it previously had
applied identical criteria to find statutes to be void for vagueness and for
7
overbreadth.10. U.S. CONsTr. art. 1, §§ 9, 10; see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388-91 (1798).
11. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931) (symbolic speech).
12. See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (street demonsttation); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indpt. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (school protests);
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (picketing);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (obstructing public passage).
13. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 577 n.20 (1974). Hereinafter, "void-for-vagueness"
will be noted simply as "vagueness."
14. E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1972); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). See also Void-forVagueness Doctrine, supra note 3, at 75-85; 53 MIcH. L. REv. 264, 273-74 (1954).
15. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). See also 53 Mic. L. REv.
264, 273-74 n.52 (1954).
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 577 n.20 (1974); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 114 (1972).
17. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948); Collings, supra note 3,
at 218-19.
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Vagueness
The vagueness doctrine restricts the power of the legislature to use
unclear terms to declare conduct criminal. The doctrine reflects the
notion that "[mien of common intelligence cannot be required to guess
at the meaning of [a criminal] enactment." 18 This doctrine has its origins
in the common law principle that required criminal statutes to be construed strictly so that criminal liability would attach only to clearly
proscribed conduct.' 9 The notion that statutes should give "fair warning"
of what is forbidden or required has been imported into the concept of
due process, 2° and for this reason, the prohibition of vague criminal
statutes generally now is grounded in the fifth and fourteenth amendments.2 The vagueness doctrine, however, also has been supported under the due process clauses as a means of ensuring that juries and law
enforcement officials are given standards sufficiently definite to prevent
22
arbitrary or discriminatory application of criminal statutes.
The vagueness doctrine more effectively has secured definitive standards to guide law enforcement than it has ensured that persons subject
to criminal laws are not punished unless they receive fair warning.2 The
18. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948) (footnote omitted). See also
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); 53 MICH. L. REV. 264, 267 (1954).
19. See, e.g., Todd v. United States, 158 U.S. 278, 282 (1895); United States v. Brewer,
139 U.S. 278, 288 (1891); United States v. Sharp, 27 F. Cas. 1041, 1043 (No. 16,264)
(C.C. Pa. 1815); The Enterprise, 8 F. Cas. 732, 734-35 (No. 4,499) (C.C.N.Y. 1810).
Strict construction of criminal laws at common law has been traced back to the
Roman maxim ibi jus znccrtzan, ibi jus nullhrm (where the law is uncertain there is
no law). 53 MICH. L. REV. 264, 266 (1954).
20. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Cline v. Frink
Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 458 (1927); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S.
81, 89 (1921). See also Collings, supra note 3, at 196, 204-05.
21. See, e.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 453 (1927). For
a discussion of the due process aspects of the vagueness doctrine, see 53 MICH. L. REV.
264, 267-70 (1954). See generally 62 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1948).
22. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-71 (1972). See
generally 62 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1948); 53 MICH. L. REV. 264, 265-66 (1954).
In addition to guiding law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and courts in their
application of statutes, the requirement of statutory definiteness aids defendants
in preparation for trial. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 404 (1966); 62 HARV. L.
REV. 77, 78 (1948).
23. Packer, supra note 3, at 124; Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 3, at 81.
One commentator has suggested that vagueness decisions have been more successful in
guiding enforcement than in giving warning because the real purpose of the doctrine
is to serve as a practical mechanism for "mediating between, on the one hand, all of
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fair warning function of the doctrine is diluted by the longstanding practice of upholding convictions for violations of vague laws if previous
judicial decisions gave the laws more definite content, either by narrowing the statute so that only clearly prohibited conduct was banned or by
simply deciding that certain conduct fell within a vague statute.24 Justice
Bushrod Washington, writing as Circuit Justice in 1815, evidenced the
tension between the vagueness doctrine and this limitation on it. The
Justice declared that "[laws which create crimes, ought to be so explicit
in themselves, or by reference to some other standard, that all men, subject to their penalties, may know what acts it is their duty to avoid." 25
Following this precept, he dismissed the indictments against four seamen
for making a revolt because the statute lacked the required specificity.
Although Justice Washington said that the meaning of "revolt" always
had been clear to him and the evidence in the case strongly indicated that
the defendants committed the offense, the law did not define "revolt"
and the term by itself was not a sufficiently definite standard to support
criminal liability.2 6 Nonetheless, Washington said the defendants could
be convicted for confining the master because the actions comprising
this offense were outlawed explicitly in a prior decision.2 7 More recently,
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Supreme Court, upheld a conviction
by court-martial on the ground that, however vague the articles under
which the defendant was charged, prior construction of the statute by
the organs of public coercion of a state and, on the other hand, the institution of
federal protection of the individual's private interests." Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine,
supra note 3, at 81. Other mechanisms, principally those of statutory construction, are
available to federal courts to limit discretionary federal power over individuals, but,
except for total proscription of state control in certain areas, no other means exists
for federal courts to regulate state exercise of discretionary power. Id. at 75-85, 109-15.
The confusion and conflict created by the doctrinal similarity of ignorantia legis and
the "fair warning" theory of the vagueness doctrine also may contribute to the
questionable effectiveness of the latter doctrine. Cf. Packer, supra note 3, at 123-24.
See also notes 69-71 infra & accompanying text.
24. In Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), for example, the Supreme Court relied
on narrowing or clarifying judicial construction of vague statutes to find conviction
proper when other "authoritative sources" had placed the defendant's conduct within
the relevant written proscription. Id. at 752-55. See also Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U.S. 395 (1953); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine, supra note 3, at 73; 62 HARv. L. REv. 77, 82 (1948).

25. United States v. Sharp, 27 F. Cas. 1041, 1043 (No. 16,264) (C.C. Pa. 1815).
26. Id.
27. Id. It is not clear whether the rationale for Justice Washington's vagueness
rulings was the need for fair warning or for controlling discretion of enforcement
officials. Both rationales were argued by the defendants in Sbarp.
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"authoritative military sources" established that the defendant's conduct
28
was prohibited.
Intersecting Intent
In Screws v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court found statutory
vagueness to be cured if conviction under the law, as interpreted,
required a showing of intent. The plurality opinion in Screws, which
declared that the "constitutional requirement that a criminal statute be
definite ... gives a person acting with reference to the statute fair warning that his conduct is within its prohibition," 30 upheld the statute
involved against a vagueness challenge because it punished only "willful"
violations. " The defendants in Screws were charged with violating
section 20 of the Criminal Code 32 by willfully depriving another of his
federally secured rights, privileges, or immunities." The plurality of the
Court construed the section to require an intent to deprive a person of
his federal civil rights. 34 Three of the dissenting Justices, however, noted
that "[i]f a statute does not satisfy the due-process requirement of giving
decent advance notice of what it is which, if happening, will be visited
with punishment, so that men may presumably have an opportunity to
avoid the happening . . . then wilfully bringing to pass such an undefined and too uncertain event cannot make it sufficiently definite and
ascertainable." " Recently, in Smith v. Goguen,3" the Court rejected the
28. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752-57 (1974). The Court declared that laws are
invalidated on vagueness grounds only if no ascertainable standard exists by which to
judge their violation; laws are not, however, void if they contain an "imprecise but
comprehensible normative standard." Id. at 755. The Court admitted that the laws
challenged by Captain Levy, articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, were vague, but found their application to Levy's conduct clear. In the

words of the Court, "[one to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness." Id. at 756. Having found the articles properly
applied to the defendant's conduct, the Court said that Levy could not raise a vagueness challenge on behalf of other putative defendants. Id. at 755-56. See also United

States v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1975).
29. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
30. Id. at 103-04.
31. Id. at 101-04.

32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
33. The fatal beating of an individual by police was alleged to have violated the
deceased's right not to be deprived of life without due process. 325 U.S. at 92-93.
34. The plurality further indicated, perhaps in response to the criticisms of dissenting
justices, see id. at 149-53, that the intent requirement cured indefiniteness only if the
scope of the federal right a defendant was accused of violating had been made clear
by prior decisions. Id. at 103.
35. Id. at 154 (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted).
36. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
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position taken by the plurality in Screws, finding that a requirement of
intent did not save a vague statute.Y Concurring, Justice White would
have found the statute, a Massachusetts flag contempt law, overbroad
but not vague, relying on the specific intent element to overcome the
ambiguity of the lawY8

Intent
The Court has not determined the meaning of intent, nor has it
decided whether intent is constitutionally required for conviction of any
crime. Supreme Court opinions have viewed intent variously as a
decision to do an act without any necessary purpose to violate the law
or to bring about a forbidden harm,3 9 or as voluntary commission of an
act with the purpose of bringing about a forbidden harm.40 In Screws,
the plurality opinion, written by Justice Douglas, intimates that intent
additionally includes the desire to violate the law: "The requirement that
the act must be willful or purposeful . . . relieve[s] the statute of the
objection that it punishes without warning an offense of which the
accused was unaware." 41
The inability of the Justices to agree on a definition of intent is to
some extent understandable. A finding of me=e rea, or "criminal intent,"
involves an inquiry into the mental state of the actor charged with the
commission of a crime. Criminal intent traditionally has been an element
of criminal liability: a guilty mind, as well as a guilty act, is required for
conviction. 42 Just as the nature of an action that triggers criminal sanctions varies with the crime, so does the requisite intent. With reference to
specific crimes, therefore, "intent' properly has various meanings. Whatever the specific definition given intent, however, the objective of the
requirement is to limit punishment to persons who commit a forbidden
act as the result of some culpable mental state. 43
37. Id. at 580.

38. Id. at 585 (White, J., concurring).
39. See, e.g., Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 257 (1907).

40. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-07 (1945).
41. Id. at 102; see also id. at 104-05, 107. But see Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S.
211, 226 (1974); United States v. Ehrllchman, No. 74-1882 (D.C. Cir., May 17, 1976),
at 14-20.

42. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-52 (1952).
Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLuM. L. Rav. 55, 55-56 (1933).

See Sayre, Public

The importation of mens rea

into the law has been credited to religion; the intent requirement was designed to limit
penalization to those who were morally blameworthy. J. Hall, Prolegomena to a
Science of Criminal Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 558 (1941).
43. Mens rea traditionally requires a purposeful, knowing, or reckless act. The

Model Penal Code, however, suggests that negligence also may be a criminal mental
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Not only has the Supreme Court defined intent inconsistently, but the
Court also has been unable to decide whether intent is a required element
of crime. The late Professor Packer paraphrased the decisions of the
Court on intent: "Mens rea is an important requirement, but not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes." " Early in the 20th century,
the Court appeared to have rejected conclusively a constitutional requirement of mens rea. Although the established facts of Shevlin-Carpenter
Co. v. Minnesota4 5 seemingly supported a finding of intent, the Court
rejected the contention that intent is "an essential element of crime." 46
47
Relying on Shevlin-Carpenter, the Court, in United States v. Balint,
refused a due process objection to an indictment that failed to allege any
mens rea. After noting the general common law requirement of criminal
intent,48 Chief Justice Taft stated that the rule had been modified "in
respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would be
obstructed by such a requirement." 49No dissenting opinions were filed
in Shevlin-Carpenter or Balint, and United States v. Dotterweich,5 °
decided in 1943, appeared to establish firmly that intent was not constitutionally required. In Dotterweich, the Court affirmed the conviction
of a pharmaceutical company executive for shipping misbranded drugs
even though the drugs apparently were labeled by the defendant's company in reliance on the manufacturer's labeling.5' The decision, however,
spawned a vigorous four-justice dissent,5 2 indicating that the earlier consensus of the Court on the issue of mens rea had evaporated.
Although the Court continued to assert the vitality of Shevlinstate. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (d)

(1962).

See generally Packer, supra note 3, at

138-40. Failure to require any intent results in a strict liability crime.
44. Packer, supra note 3, at 107.
45. 218 U.S. 57 (1910).

46. Id. at 70.
47. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).

48. Id. at 251-52.
49. id. at 252.
50. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
51. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, explained that the "legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some
wrongdoing." Id. at 281. Although hardship may be caused "under a statute which thus
penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting," the
Court declared with approval that "[balancing relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon those who have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers . . .
Id. at 284-85.
52. Justice Murphy, joined in dissent by Justices Roberts, Reed, and Rutledge,
attacked the lack of any statutory mens rea requirement, the vagueness of the statute
and the imposition of vicarious liability. Id. at 285-93 (dissenting opinion).
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Ca'penter, Balint, and Dotterweich, the division in Dotterweicb foreshadowed subsequent equivocation by the Court on the constitutionality
of punishing without mens rea. In Morissette v. Uvited States,3 the
Court without dissent 54 found the menzs rea required for larceny at
common law to be implicit in a federal statute that prohibited, without
mention of intent, theft of government property. The Court, stressing
that a "guilty mind" historically was required for criminal punishment
under Anglo-American law,55 inferred a mens rea requirement. The
prohibited action, the Court held in Morrissette,was akin to common law
larceny, for which intent was required.5 6 Although Balint had upheld the
constitutionality of a criminal statute despite the absence of an intent
requirement and had refused to find a requirement of mens rea in the
statute because none had been specified, the decision in Morissette
approved Balint,57 distinguishing it as dealing with a "public welfare offense." 5s Unlike the larceny-type statute in Morissette, such regulatory
laws "do not fit neatly into any ... accepted classifications of commonlaw offenses." " Thus, the Court rationalized its inference of an intent
requirement in Morissette with its failure to do so in Balint.6 °
The distinction between regulatory statutes and other criminal statutes
remains the principal method used by the Court to distinguish otherwise inconsistent holdings on the constitutional necessity of intent in
6 2 decided 5 years after
criminal statutes.61 In Lambert v. California,
Morissette, a five-justice majority reversed a conviction under a Los
Angeles felon-registration ordinance. The ordinance, the Court held,
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

342 U.S. 246 (1952).
Justice Douglas concurred in the result and Justice Minton did not participate.
342 U.S. at 250-52.
Id. at 260-65.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 252-56.
Id. at 255.

60. Justice Frankfurter, writing the opinion in Morissette, stated:
While [public welfarc] offenses do not threaten the security of the state
in the manner of treason, they may be regarded as offenses against its
authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed
essential to the social order as presently constituted. In this respect, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences
are injurious or not according to fortuity. . . . [Clourts have turned to
construing statutes and regulations which make no mention of intent as
dispensing with it and holding that the guilty act alone makes out the crime.
Id. at 256.
61. This reasoning has been criticized soundly. See, e.g., Packer, supra note 3, at
120-21.
62. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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violated due process by failing to include any intent requirement while
punishing "wholly passive" conduct."3 More recently, in United
States v. Freed," the Court held that no intent need be shown to punish
possession of unregistered firearms 65 and, in Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville,66 struck down vagrancy laws punishing "normally innocent" conduct without any requirement of mens rea.67 The Court was
unwilling to require mens rea in Freed because the law at issue was "a
regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety, which [could]
well be premised on the theory that one would hardly be surprised to
learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act." 68
Intersecting Ignorance
The decisions of the Supreme Court that invoke the vagueness and
intent doctrines thus establish that due process requires persons to be
given fair warning of what conduct is prohibited. There need be no
reasonable expectation, however, that a defendant actually know what
is prohibited when he acts, and conduct proscribed by regulatory statutes
may be punished without regard to intent, while other criminal conduct
may not.
The acceptance of ignorantialegis appears at least partly to be responsible for the inconsistencies in the vagueness and intent decisions of the
Supreme Court. In the 19th century, federal courts invariably held
ignorance of the law not to excuse statutory crimes, just as such
ignorance had not been a defense to common law crimes. 69 The Supreme
7°
Court has adhered to that position throughout the 20th century,
creating tensions with the rationale used to declare statutes invalid
because of vagueness.
Certainly, allowing defendants to be punished for conduct that they
did not know to be criminal conflicts with the desire to punish only
those who have received fair warning that their acts were prohibited.
Thus, although the Court often has recognized that potential defendants
63. Id. at 228-29.
64. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).

65. Id. at 607-10.
66. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
67. Id. at 163.
68. 401 U.S. at 609 (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Buntin, 10 F. 730, 734-35 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882).
70. See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 562-65
(1971); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v.
Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910).
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may be ignorant of vague laws, it has, in an apparent attempt to reduce
the tension between ignorantialegis and the vagueness doctrine, increasingly stressed the alternate rationale for the latter doctrine: prevention
of arbitrary or discriminatory application of the law."'
The difficulty that the Court faces with questions of intent also is
linked to its view of ignorance. In 1907, the Court declared that "fi]f a
man intentionally adopts certain conduct in certain circumstances known
to him, and that conduct is forbidden by the law under those circumstances, he intentionally breaks the law in the only sense in which the
law ever considers intent." 72 This formulation simply reflects what
Justice Brennan recently observed: traditional mens rea "does not require
knowledge that an act is illegal, wrong or blameworthy." 73 In Screws v.

United States,74 however, the plurality seemed to find implicit in the law
that defendants were accused of violating a mens rea requirement,
including intent to violate the law; 75 without an intent to violate the
law, requiring intent would not cure vagueness as the Court in Screws
found it did. 76 In Lambert v. California,77 too, though speaking in terms
of intent, the Court prohibited punishment of an individual who had no
71. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974); Papachrstou v.City of Jacksonrlle,
405 U.S. 156, 162-63 (1972).
72. Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 257 (1907).
73. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
74. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
75. See id. at 101-04.
76. Id. at 102-04. See Packer, supra note 3,at 122-23; cf. Collings, supra note 3. As
long as one may be ignorant of the law and be convicted nonetheless, an intent requirement-for example, that a prohibited act be done willfully-does not enhance the
quality of the statutory warning to defendant. Furthermore, requiring intent may
prevent criminalization of "morally blameless ' persons, but it does not affect discriminatory enforcement made possible under vague statutes. Thus, neither rationale for
vagueness decisions is satisfied by convicting persons for intentional violations of vague
statutes. If, however, the intent required is not the traditional mens rea, such as
purposefully performing an action while aware of all relevant facts, but instead includes
the purpose of violating a known statute, at least one rationale for vagueness is fulfilled
by the intent requirement: the defendant who intended to violate the statute cannot
deny that he had "fair warning" that his act was criminal.
Justice Douglas's opinion for the majority in Lavnbert eloquently illustrates the difficulties of the law under the "intent" rubric. The defendants would not be found to have
violated the law only because they had beaten the arrestee intentionally; to have
willfully deprived the arrestee of his federal rights, defendants had to have beaten him
with the purpose of depriving him of his right to trial. 325 U.S. at 107. Nonetheless,
recent attempts have been made to harmonize Screws with ignorantialegis. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226 (1974); United States v. Ehrlichman, No.
74-1882 (D.C. Cir., May 17, 1976), at 14-20.
77. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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notice of the law involved, declaring nonetheless that as a general rule,
"ignorance of the law will not excuse." 8 Requiring knowledge of the
78. Id. at 228, quoting Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
Justice Douglas's opinion for the majority in Lambert eloquently illustrates the difficulties that the Court has had in dealing with doctrines respecting criminal liability that
are distinct from, but related to, each other. Initially, Douglas framed the question
for decision in terms of ignorance, asking whether due process permits criminal
liability for a person who lacked both probable and "actual knowledge" of the violated
statute. Immediately, however, the focus of the opinion turned to the question of
mens rea. The felon-registration ordinance did not specify an intent requirement, and
Douglas declared that, as a general rule, criminal statutes need not require intent.
La'mbert was distinguished from prior intent cases by finding circumstances in other
cases that would alert the putative defendant to the consequences of his act or failure
to act. Clearly, however, the consequences to which the cited cases found defendants
alerted were factual, not legal: in Balint and Dotterweicb the Court had noted that
persons dispensing drugs should be aware, not that their actions might be criminal,
but that their actions might pose a danger to others; the third decision relied upon,
Sbevihi-Carpe7nter, indicated that the defendants should have known that their permit
to cut timber on state land had expired. 218 U.S. at 57, 63, 69. The distinction made
between Lambert and the cases cited by the Court thus hardly supports the holding
that the defendant could not constitutionally be convicted absent a showing that she
was alerted to the legal consequences of her actions.
From discussion of Balint, Dotterweich, and Shevlin-Carpenter, Justice Douglas pro-

ceeded to note cases declaring that certain interests in property could not be adjudicated if the claimant of an interest lacked adequate notice of the proceeding. 355
U.S. at 228, citing Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Covey v.
Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950). It has been noted that "Miss Lambert, like any criminal defendant,
had received [personal notice of the proceedings affecting her interests]." Packer,
supra note 3, at 132 n.95.
The point Justice Douglas made by all these inapposite citations is that many areas
of the law require that persons be warned, actually or constructively, that their
actions or omissions may seriously affect themselves or others. In Lambert, the
defendant lacked warning that anyone would be affected by her unregistered presence
in Los Angeles; to prevent a manifestly unjust conviction, the Court must require
some warning. In Ltrmbert, where no direct potential injury to others could be found,
the only effective warning it could require was warning that the defendant's actions
violated a law. After lengthy discussion of intent and notice cases, and despite the
affirmation that ignorance of the law will not excuse, Lambert held that ignorance of
either the law or of possible wrongdoing can excuse. 355 U.S. at 229-30.
Two later opinions confirm that if in Justice Douglas's view one who is ignorant
of the law should be aware that his actions may be harmful to others, his ignorance
will not excuse; if the defendant has no ground for knowledge that his actions may
harm others, Douglas would have allowed ignorance or even mistake of law to excuse,
but would have done so through interpretation of intent to include purposefully
illegal action. Writing-for the majority in United States v. International Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971), Douglas held ignorance of the law no defense to
a charge that the defendant "knowingly violated" a regulation pertaining to interstate shipment of sulphuric acid. Three years later, Douglas dissented from a denial
of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which had affirmed the
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law might well be consistent with the goal of a mens rea requirement,
to punish only those who voluntarily have committed a crime; clearly,
however, knowledge of the law is not essential to traditional mens rea.
Whether because of or despite its confusion of these separate concepts,
the Court has held that neither mens rea nor knowledge of the law
generally is necessary for criminal conviction.

ignorantia Legis
The inconsistencies in the judicial pronouncements regarding vagueness and intent, created by the struggle to prevent "unfair" convictions
without abandoning the concept that ignorance of the law cannot
excuse, do more than introduce disharmony into the theoretical structure
of the criminal law. The inconsistencies also reduce the effectiveness of
these doctrines in securing the fairness posited as their goal. Both the
doctrines and the goal of preventing unfair imposition of criminal
liability would be aided by recognizing lack of knowledge of the law as
a defense. Putting aside for the moment the types of ignorance that
should excuse, the starting point must be acknowledgment that this is a
separate defense, not a matter to be accomplished by creating special
intent requirements for extraordinary cases. Indeed, the need for a
defense of ignorance separate from the law of intent is largely the result
of the difficulties faced by the Court with that area of the law since the
advent of regulatory crimes. At common law, the mens rea necessary to
convict generally required that the government show the defendant to
have acted purposefully to bring about a harm, to have known facts
indicating that the harm would be a likely result of his action, or to have
acted without concern for whether the harm would follow. 9 The
combinations of acts and harms to which these requirements applied
were known by the community to be proscribed; under the M'Naghten
rule, failure to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's act became the
standard for insanity. 0 Given common law crimes and intent requireconviction of a defendant for "knowingly fail[ingl" to comply with the Selective
Service laws. Sundstrom v. United States, 95 S. Ct. 205 (1974), denying cert. to 489 F.2d
859 (2d Cir. 1973). In International Minerals, Justice Douglas declared that ignorance
of the law never had been thought to excuse nor could it be incorporated into the
term "knowingly" that set out the 7nens tea requirement. 402 U.S. at 561-63. In
Sundstrom, however, Douglas argued that where a defendant clearly was mistaken as
to, or ignorant of, the law, courts should not indulge "the fiction that all men know
the law." 95 S. Ct. at 206 (dissenting opinion).
79. See L. Hall & Seligman, snpra note 5, at 644; cf. Keedy, supra note 4, at 78-81.
80. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
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ments, Anglo-American courts thus found knowledge of the law to be
unnecessary to guard against unfair criminal punishment. The rationales
for and against igorantia legis, however, merit examination in light of
the changed nature of crimes and of mens rea requirements.
THE CASE AGAINST IGNORANTIA LEGIS

The case against ig-norantia legis is rarely argued, though criticisms of
the doctrine have been made by authors who support its retention.,'
Along with such friendly criticism, discussions of related doctrines provide a basis for a critique of ignorantialegis. Professor Packer, for example, objects to the refusal of the Court to require mens rea; his reasoning
also could justify excusing by reason of ignorance. He found a consensus
that punishment of conduct without reference to intent is "both
inefficacious and unjust" because one who acts without "awareness of
the factors making [his conduct] criminal" is not to be deterred by
criminalizing such conduct, nor can he be held morally culpable."'
Similarly, it may be argued that punishing a defendant who acted in
ignorance of the law is not likely to deter such conduct or to remove
a socially dangerous individual from the public domain; nor is such
punishment just-the defendant's ignorance does not mark his act as one
properly calling for retribution.
The first basis for criticism of ignorantialegis, then, is the inefficacy
of punishing the ignorant. Punishing persons who are not aware of the
law making their conduct criminal has no direct deterrent effect."3 The
act for which such a defendant is punished could not have been
deterred by the potential for punishment of which he was unaware.8 4
Nor will such punishment increase the ability of the law to deter him
from repeating his illegal act. Having been informed of the illegality of his
conduct when charged with a crime, the formerly ignorant offender will
not be able to sustain a plea of ignorance as to future similar illegal acts.
81. See note 5 supra & accompanying text.
82. Packer, supra note 3, at 109. According to Packer, punishment without requiring
mens rea is "inefficacious because conduct unaccompanied by an awareness of the
factors making it criminal does not mark the actor as one who needs to be subjected
to punishment in order to deter him or others from behaving similarly in the future,
nor does it single him out as a socially dangerous individual who needs to be incapacitated or reformed. It is unjust because the actor is subjected to the stigma of a
criminal conviction without being morally blameworthy. Consequently, on either a
preventive or a retributive theory of criminal punishment, the criminal sanction is
inappropriate in the absence of mens rea." Id. (footnote omitted).
83. Cf. B. WOOTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 97-103 (1963).
84. Cf. Packer, supra note 3, at 109. But cf. Keedy, supra note 4, at 90-91.
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His future conduct, thus, is shaped no differently by a law that punishes
ignorant offenders than by one that excuses them. Punishing ignorant
offenders nonetheless may have an indirect deterrent effect: the more
persons punished, the more notorious the crime. It seems unlikely, however, that deterrence by notoriety would have much impact on commission of the relatively esoteric regulatory crimes of which ignorance most
often is pleaded, 5 and whatever deterrence is achieved must be weighed
against its cost in deterring the regulated activity.
Irrespective of the balance between the benefit of the maxim in crimes
prevented and its cost in socially desirable activities discouraged,
ignorantialegis appears objectionable because it is unfair. The doctrine
originally appears to have been a qualified maxim, compatible with
common notions of fairness.8 Roman law did not allow ignorance as a
defense to actions under the jus gentium, the law derived from the
common customs of the Italian tribes and thought to embody the basic
rules of conduct any civilized person would deduce from proper reasoning.
But ignorance of the more compendious and less common-sense jus
civile was a defense allowed women, males less than 25 years old, soldiers,
peasants, and persons of small intelligence.8 T A defendant not otherwise
exempted from the maxim's application apparently also was allowed a
defense of ignorance of the jus civile if he had not had the opportunity
88
to consult counsel familiar with the laws.
The English law adopted ignorantia legis without the qualifications
that, under Roman law, tempered its harshness.!9 Even so, for centuries
the doctrine did not appear to produce unjust results. In Anglo-American civil law, damage to another individual generally is a prerequisite
to the defendant's liability.90 If damage is not a formal element of
liability, as in actions for trespass to land, an intangible damage has
occurred by definition if the required elements are proved,"' and the
award of "technical damages," to which plaintiffs are limited unless
85. Commentators have noted that ignorance of the law is pleaded almost exclusively
in cases involving "minor offenses." See, e.g., J. Hall, supra note 5, at 20; notes 127-28
infra & accompanying text.
86. See L. Hall & Seligman, supra note 5, at 643-46; Keedy, supra note 4.
87. L. Hall & Seligman, supra note 5, at 643-44; Keedy, supra note 4, at 80.
88. Keedy, supra note 4, at 81.
89. Id. at 75, 80. Hall and Seligman argue that ignorantia legis found its way into
English law not from Roman law but as a vestige of the early Norman doctrine of
absolute liability. L. Hall & Seligman, supra note 5, at 643.
90. 0. HOLMIES, THE COMMON LAW 79, 144 (1881); J. Hall, Interrelationsof Crhnial
Law and Torts, 43 COLum. L. REv. 967, 969 (1943).
91. See, e.g., Foust v. Kinney, 202 Ala. 392, 80 So. 474 (1918). See generally C. McCORMicK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 22 (1935).
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actual damage may be presumed or shown, hardly can be viewed as a
stiff punishment. The imposition of civil liability thus can be justified as
compensating the victim for his loss; even if liability is not predicated
on intent or negligence, the individual made chiefly liable may be viewed
as less "innocent" than the person compensated, because the law of torts
makes liable the person thought best able to avoid the harm. 2 As applied
to Anglo-American civil law, therefore, ignorantialegis seems consistent
with most rights of community members.
Until a century ago, the application of the maxim to criminal law also
seemed fair, as a practical if not as a theoretical matter." Crimes initially
were limited to a relatively few offenses that every sane person old
94
enough to become a defendant reasonably could be presumed to know.
Even as the number of offenses expanded, 5 their basic nature remained
the same and the protection of mens rea insured that noncompliance with
the law was not punished unless both the actor's intent and his act were
blameworthy. Given this setting, the unquestioning acceptance of
ignorantia legis by the foremost legal minds of the 18th and 19th centuries 0 is not surprising. Nor is it surprising that as the criminal law
increasingly came to be used as a sanction for various regulatory
measures designed to advance social and economic policies that were connected only tangentially with community moral standards9 7 and as
mens rea was abandoned for these crimes,9 8 authors made greater efforts
to examine and to justify the doctrine.99 Because the criminal law is
designed to enforce rules rather than to compensate victims,1 00 and
therefore may punish commission of an act even if no damage ensues,0'T
application of ignorantialegis to a wide variety of crimes now appears
offensive to the standards of fairness embodied in civil law and
expounded in discussions of other facets of criminal law.
92. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
HOLMES, supra note 90, at 144-46.
93. Cf. L. Hall & Seligman, supra note 5, at 644; Hart, supra note 5, at 413-15, 420.
94. See Keedy, supra note 4, at 78-80; cf. L. Hall & Seligman, supra note 5, at 644.
95. See Hart, supra note 5, at 430; Hughes, supra note 5, at 594-95.
96. See L. Hall & Seligman, supra note 5, at 646-48.
97. Cf. Sayre, supra note 42, at 68-69.
98. Hughes, supra note 5, at 594-95; Savre, supra note 42, at 58-67. See notes 44-68
supra & accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., J. Hall, supra note 5; Keedv, supra note 4; Perkins, supra note 6.
100. J. Hall, Interrelationsof Crininal Law and Torts, 43 CoLc.m. L. REv. 967, 969-70
(1943); see Sayre, supra note 42, at 67-70.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). See also
J. Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 967, 969 (1943).

0.
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A relatively clear standard of fairness has been espoused, for example,
with regard to ex post facto laws, which impose or increase criminal
sanctions for acts not punishable when committed or alter the evidence
necessary for conviction. °2 An early objection to ignorantialegis was
that it embodied the same unfairness as ex post facto laws, at least when
applied to ignorance of "positive regulations, not taught by nature." '
An author surveying American customs and institutions and comparing
them with their European counterparts wrote in 1792:
Where a man is ignorant of [a positive regulation], he is in the
same situation as if the law did not exist. To read it to him from the
tribunal, where he stands arraigned for the breach of it, is to him
precisely the same thing as it would be to originate it at the time
04
by the same tribunal for the express purpose of his condemnation.
In Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota,10 5 the Supreme Court rejected
this analogy, declaring that "innocence cannot be asserted of an action
which violates existing law, and ignorance of the law will not excuse.
The law in controversy [punishing casual and involuntary trespass to
state lands] has no ex post facto element or effect in it." 10' Justice
McKenna's majority opinion did not attempt to evaluate the impact of
the ex post facto provision on ignorantia legis, but simply disposed of
the analogy by noting that ex post facto cases dealt with laws enacted
after an individual's action. The expansion of the ex post facto prohibition urged by the defendant would have conflicted with ignorantia
102. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 386, 390 (1798).
103.

J.

BARLOW, ADVICE TO THE PRIVILEGED ORDERS IN TM

SEVERAL STATES OF EUROPE

(1792), reprinted in 3 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA 504, 511 (1968).
104. Id. Barlow found that American judicial rules and institutions compared favorably with those of European countries, except that like the English and unlike the
French, American courts followed the ignorantia legis maxim. He viewed adherence
to the maxim as antithetical not only to the specific constitutional provision respecting
ex post facto laws, but also to basic Anglo-American principles respecting individual
freedoms and the reasons for criminal accountability. Barlow concluded that "to
compel a compliance with orders which are unknown is carrying injustice beyond the
bounds of necessity; it is absurd and even impossible. Laws in this case may be
avenged but cannot be obeyed ..

. ."

Id. at 512.

More recently, the ex post facto provision has been relied on to urge a constitutional
requirement of mens rea as an essential ingredient of criminal liability. Hippard, The
Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault: An Argmzent for a Constitutional Doctrine of Mens Rea, 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 1039, 1054-55 (1973). The ex post
facto analogy, however, has not convinced modern commentators to reassess the
validity of ignorantialegis. See J. Hall, supra note 5, at 35 n.143, 43 n.165.
105. 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
106. Id. at 68.
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legis; the opinion treated the latter maxim as though it were a constitutional mandate that had to be harmonized with the ex post facto clause
and refused the expansion. °7
Certainly, more injustice derives from punishing a man for an offense
that was not criminal at the time of his act than from punishing him
when he was unaware of the act's illegality for another reason. Nonetheless, courts have recognized that it is unfair to penalize one who
cannot reasonably be expected to know that his act is illegal, even if his
ignorance is caused by something other than the nonexistence of the law
at the moment of defendant's assertedly criminal act.' 08 Assessing a
vagueness challenge, the Supreme Court noted that imposing criminal
liability for violation of a statute that failed to define adequately the
conduct it prohibited "would be like sanctioning the practice of Caligula
who 'published the law, but it was written in a very small hand, and
posted up in a corner, so that no one could make a copy of it.'" 109 In
response to a defense of ignorance argued before a federal circuit court
in 1810, it was held that sanctions could not be imposed for violation of
a law passed before the violation, when no copy of the law had been
received at the place where the act occurred until after the alleged
offense." 0
Most decisions that define a standard of fairness for punishing persons
unaware of the illegality of their actions do not involve the inaccessibility
of the statute making the actions criminal. In cases in which the vagueness of a statute is alleged, criminal liability is not imposed for violation
of an existing, accessible statute unless the statute gives "fair warning." ill
Although decisions have not always been consistent with this rationale,
perhaps as the result of the influence of the rationale used to support
ignoratialegis, 12 a number of cases clearly adhere to the principle that
fair warning of the criminality of an act is required before the commission of the act is punishable."' In Lambert v. California, 4 the fair
warning requirement was extended beyond statutory specificity to
include a reasonable likelihood that the defendant was aware that the law
107. Id. at 68-69.

108. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
109. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945).
110. The Cotton Planter, 6 F. Cas. 620 (No. 3,270)

Seligman, supra note 5, at 657-58.
111. See notes 19-20 supra & accompanying text.
112. See notes 69-78 supra & accompanying text.
113. See note 20 supra.
114. 335 U.S. 225 (1957).

(C.C.N.Y. 1810); see L. Hall &
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required some particular conduct."9 The crux of the case against ignorantia legis thus is embodied in this question: If it is inconsistent with
basic notions of fairness to penalize one for an act that, because of the
nonexistence, inaccessibility, or vagueness of the law, the actor believed
legal when done, why is it fair to punish one who is ignorant of the law
for any other reason?
IGNORANTIA LEGIs DEFENDED

Because the courts have seemed willing to accept ignorantialegis as a
fixed star, the task of answering the question posed in opposition to the
maxim has fallen largely to academicians. Legal scholars have defended
punishing those ignorant of the law on numerous bases;"' from these,
five major rationales appear. Professor Austin argued that to investigate
a man's knowledge or ignorance of the law in each case would hopelessly
enmesh the courts in assessing virtually insoluble problems. 1 7 Although
fear of presenting difficult factual issues to courts may be a prime factor
in continued judicial adherence to ignorantialegis, the argument was
rejected firmly by Holmes nearly a century ago and no one has expressed
much support for it since. 1 8 Holmes "doubted whether a man's knowledge of the law is any harder to investigate than many questions which
are gone into." "I Considering the range of issues now put to judges or
juries, particularly those relating to a defendant's state of mind when
"specific intent" crimes are involved, it is difficult to quarrel with
Holmes's observation.
The second major justification for ignorantia legis, advanced in
2° and advocated
Blackstone's Connnentaries1
most vigorously by
12
1
Holmes, is that adherence to the maxim deters crime. 22 If ignorance
115. See note 78 supra.

116. The historical development of early defenses of ignorantia legis is set forth in
L. Hall & Seligman, supra note 5, at 646-51.
117. J. Aus-rN, LECTURES oN JURISPRUDENCE 498-500 (1869); see also L. Hall & Seligman, supra note 5, at 646-47.
118. 0. HOLMES, supra note 90, at 48; but cf. L. Hall & Seligman, supra note 5, at
647.
119. 0. HOLMES, supra note 90, at 48.
120. 1 W. BLACKSTON.E, COMMENTARIES *45-46; see also L. Hall & Seligman, supra note
5, at 646.
121. 0. HOLMES, supra note 90, at 48-49.

122. See also Perkins, supra note 6, at 41. Application of the maxim is said to deprive
criminals of an easy defense to criminal charges, thereby raising the likely penalty
sufficiently to prevent persons contemplating committing crimes, or indifferent to the
criminality of their actions, from committing criminal acts. See notes 123-24 infra &
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excused, according to Blackstone, the law could be "eluded with impunity," 123 or as Holmes put it, allowing a defense of ignorance would
encourage ignorance of the laws.12 Application of ignorantia legis,
however, cannot deter persons from repeating their offenses and can
have only an indirect effect on deterring others.125 Holmes used robbery
and murder as examples of crimes that should be discouraged for the
good of the entire community; the community, he reasoned, must sacrifice the individual to the public goal of avoiding murder and robbery by
punishing ignorant as well as knowing and intentional transgressors so
that all may know these acts to be illegal.' 2 6
Robbery and murder offer attractive examples, but ignorance of their
criminality is virtually impossible. Ignorance is most likely to be pleaded
to regulatory measures; 2 7 examples, collected by Professor Perkins, of
cases in which ignorance of the law was pleaded, and rejected, as a
defense include operating a gaming device, betting on a horse race, conducting a raffle, and operating a saloon on election day after the close of
the election. 28 Although defendants may harbor mistaken beliefs as to
what constitutes robbery or murder, 29 it is unlikely that any defendant
would plead ignorance that these were criminal, except incident to a
plea of insanity. If regulatory, rather than heinous, crimes are used as
prototypes, the inadequacies of the deterrence rationale may be seen
clearly. Convictions for these crimes are unlikely to receive the publicity
accorded trials for murder, assault, embezzlement, and other crimes
that appeal to the popular sense of adventure, so that ignorantia legis
sacrifices the individual without educating, and hence without deterring,
the public. Further, if less heinous crimes are involved, surely the balance between community and individual rights must be weighed more in
favor of the individual. Embodied in the Constitution is the notion that
accompanying text. Hall and Seligman, however, attribute the deterrent effect of
ignorantia legis to facilitation of the educational function of the law: if all persons
are punished, regardless of ignorance, all members of society more easily will accept
the "wrongness" of the punished act. L. Hall & Seligman, supra note 5, at 648.
123. 1 W. BLAcKSTONE, supra note 120, at *46; see L. Hall & Seligman, supra note 5,
at 646.
124. 0. HOLMES, supra note 90, at 48.
125. See notes 83-85 supra & accompanying text.
126. 0. HOLMES, supra note 90, at 48.
127. Professor Jerome Hall found that ignorance was pleaded almost solely where
"minor offenses" were involved. J. Hall, supra note 5, at 20.
128. Perkins, supra note 6, at 36.
129. See notes 144-148 infra & accompanying text.
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fairness to individuals and orderliness in criminal proceedings are as
much public desiderata as prevention of harm to persons and property.
The third justification for ignorantia legis is perhaps the best known
and was the reason originally given in American criminal cases for adop-

tion of the doctrine:130 all men are presumed to know the law.13 1 This
presumption has been labelled "absurd," 132 and seems to ignore common
experience if applied generally. There undoubtedly are many crimes

known to all competent, nonjuvenile members of society, but even
lawyers are not aware of all federal crimes, much less of the multitude of
state offenses. Beyond the illogic of such a presumption, there is no

reason it should be exempted from the scrutiny the Supreme Court finds
constitutionally mandated for other irrebuttable presumptions. The
Court in 1969 reaffirmed the rule of Tot v. United States 33 that the

validity of a presumption created by statute depends on a "rational
connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed." 134
In Leary v. United States,135 the Court reversed a conviction obtained by
use of a presumption that possessors of marijuana knew the marijuana to

have been imported.136 The Court was unable to say "with substantial

assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from

the proved fact on which it is made to depend."

137

If the basis for

130. L. Hall & Seligman, supra note 5, at 646.
131. This formulation of ignorantia legis had been put forward in England for centuries. I M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 42 (1680); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 120,

at *26. See also Keedy, supra note 4, at 80; Perkins, supra note 6, at 37-39.
132. Keedy, supra note 4, at 91.
133. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
134. Id. at 467.
135. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
136. Id. at 12.
137. Id. at 36 (footnote omitted). After announcing this test, Justice Harlan, writing
for the Court in Leary, seemed to weaken the test in its application. The ultimate,
"presumed," fact was that a possessor of marijuana knew that the marijuana he possessed had been imported. The Court recognized that "a significant percentage of
domestically consumed marijuana may not have been imported at all . . . ." Id. at 46.
But then Justice Harlan declared that the presumption of knowledge of importation
may be sustained if a majority of marijuana possessors are aware of the high rate of
importation. Id. at 46-47. Thus, a particular possessor's knowledge that his marijuana
was imported could be found from the knowledge of more than half of other
marijuana possessors that a large proportion of marijuana was imported. The Court
went on to find, however, that the government had failed to prove this or alternative
factual predicates for the presumed fact. Id. at 47-52. For pre- and post-Leary discussions of the rational connection test for statutory presumptions, see Note, The Unconsstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Preswnptions, 22 STAN. L. REv. 341 (1970); Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Preswnptions, 34 U. Ci. L. REv. 141
(1966).
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ignorantia legis is the presumption that anyone who commits a crime
knows of the law he violated, that presumption should be tested in each
case by the standard of Tot and Leary. 138 Use of the presumption when
39
it fails to satisfy that standard would violate due process.1
Another rationale relied on to support punishment of persons ignorant
of the law is that such ignorance is blameworthy in itself. 140 Holmes
rejected this thesis, noting that if it were the rationale for ignorantia
legis a nonsensical result would be achieved: failure to learn the law
138. If the justification of ignorantia legis is based on a presumption that the defendant knows of the law he violated, use of the standard set out in Tot and Leary would
make criminal law theoretically more consistent: the presumption of legal knowledge
would be treated in the same fashion as other presumptions, and tensions would be
lessened between decisions employing the Tot-Lea-ry standard and judicial pronouncements concerning ignorantia legis and mens rea.
A requirement of a rational connection between proven facts and presumed facts
is difficult to square with the present state of Supreme Court law on intent and
ignorance. Leary illustrates this problem. Since the legislature may dispense with mens
rea, Congress could have made possession of marijuana a crime without requiring the
possessor to have knowledge that the marijuana was unlawfully imported. A congressional requirement of knowledge combined with a presumption of knowledge
amounts to a roundabout statement that knowledge of importation is not required.
One possible defect to this indirect abolition of an intent requirement is that it is
stated in language too unclear to give fair warning to possible offenders. The Supreme
Court, however, never has applied the void-for-vagueness doctrine to scrutinize the
validity of irrebutrable presumptions.
If a presumption is clear, the Tot-Leary rule also conflicts with acceptance of
ignorantia legis. Under the maxim, a defendant is required to know the law; the
defendant logically also should be charged with knowledge of wvhat the law presumes.
In a fact situation similar to that of Leary, then, ignorantia legis requires the defendant
to know that possession of imported marijuana is illegal; similarly, he should be
assumed to be aware of the presumption that possessors know their marijuana to have
been imported. The Tot-Leary standard requires courts to examine the rationality of
the irrebuttable presumption. Why, however, should this examination be undertaken
if knowledge of importation need not be required and if defendants are assumed to
know of the presumption? The only apparent answer is that the presumed fact may
be essential to the competence of Congress to define and punish the crime involvedin Leary, importation, or transportation across state lines, might have been necessary
to a commerce clause basis for congressional action. Clearly, the Court has not limited
the rational connection test to presumptions affecting jurisdiction, and if the presumed
fact is necessary to Congress' jurisdiction, the presumption, even if reasonable, may be
insufficient.
139. Justice Black, concurring in Leary, attacked the constitutionality of statutory
criminal presumptions on different grounds: separation of powers and right to trial by
jury. His opinion declared that Congress could define crimes but could not tell courts
what evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of those crimes. Statutory presurnptions, he reasoned, deprived defendants of their full rights to be represented by
attorneys, to summon witnesses on their behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses against
them. 395 U.S. at 55-56 (concurring opinion).
140. See Hart, supra note 5, at 412-15.
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would be punished as severely as failure to obey it- 4' Yet, after examining
other justifications for the doctrine, it is this argument for ignorantia
legis that seems most plausible. Holmes's objection to this rationale
assumes an incorrect factual predicate. Failure to know the law is not
punished unless it leads to a violation of the law; this coincidence, not
mere ignorance, is punished to the same extent as knowing and willful
violation of the law.142 If ignorance of the law does not excuse because

it is blameworthy, the judge or jury in each case should ask whether
the particular ignorance claimed by a defendant is in fact blameworthy.143 This determination should not present any inordinate difficulties; the usual question to be resolved would be whether a reasonable,
prudent member of the community of average intelligence would ,be
aware of the violated law. If defendants were engaged in some regulated
occupation and charged with violation of a law regulating that occupation, a more rigorous test would be applied: the fact-finder would
determine whether the reasonable, prudent practitioner of that -occupation would have known the law. As presently applied, however, ignorantialegis makes no allowance for the possibility that ignorance of the
law is not always blameworthy. In light of the nature of crimes of
which ignorance is pleaded, the possibility that some ignorance may be
141. 0. HOLMES, supra note 90, at 48. See also id. at 50, 55-57.
142. Punishment, of course, may be mitigated by proof of ignorance. See L. Hall &
Seligman, supra note 5, at 650-51; Perkins, supra note 6, at 41.
143. Although finding justification for the doctrine of ignorantia legis in the culpability of failure to comprehend the law, Professor Hart found such culpability applicable only to crimes that are mala in se. Hart, supra note 5, at 419-21. Professor Hall
took exception to any distinction between mala in se and mala probibita. J. Hall,
Prolegomena to a Science of Crininal Law, 89 U. PA. L. Rav. 549, 563-69 (1941). He
traced the distinction back to Aristotle's bifurcation of improper acts between those
contrary to convention and those contrary to nature. Id. at 563. Hall argued that we
cannot separate positive law from ethical considerations as the dichotomy between
crimes mala in se and crimes mala probibita requires. Id. at 565-66. Rather than
limiting ignorantia legis to crimes mala in se, authors who find that bifurcation of
criminal law untenable apply ignorantia legis to criminal acts the community would
find unethical. See J. Hall, supra note 5, at 36.
Limiting ignorantia legis to instances of culpable failure to know that an act is
illegal gives a somewhat -more legalistic cast to the limitation. Although one's view
concerning the morality of the underlying act may in some measure determine whether
one thinks a defendant should know of the illegality of an act, morality is not always
a helpful guide. Persons may be expected to know that certain acts, such as driving
on the wrong side of the street, are illegal, even though they carry no connotation of
immorality. Conversely, it may be quite common for people to believe that other
acts, such as tax avoidance techniques, are legal, even though the acts may be considered unethical by the same people. Cf. Hart, supra note 5, at 421; Hughes, supra
note 5, at 611.
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culpable cannot justify the maxim's application in so many cases where
ignorance is likely to be blameless.
A final support for ig-norantia legis, offered by Jerome Hall, is more
concerned with mistake of law than with ignorance of it. 4 4 Although
Hall found the origin of ignorantialegis in the Roman notion that law
is definite and knowable,'4 5 he argued that defense of the doctrine must
rest on the unavoidable vagueness of the law. 46 Courts have been designated as law declarers. If defendants' mistaken beliefs about the lawfulness of certain conduct exempted the defendants from criminal liability,
Hall said, the function of the courts as law declarers would be destroyed
and the law would become what anyone thought it was. 47 Hall's fear
seems exaggerated. By exempting a defendant from punishment on the
ground that he operated under a mistaken belief as to the law, courts
would not abdicate their role in interpreting the law any more than they
do by excepting from punishment one who acted under an impression of
the law sufficiently far from correct to render the defendant insane. In
either case, the court declares what the law is but also declares that the
defendant is not criminally liable for violating it. The court thus remains
law-declarer in theory; allowing mistake of law to excuse will not
impair the law-declaring function of the courts in practice unless it
impairs obedience to the law declared. If allowing ignorance of a law to
excuse would not lessen the deterrent effect of the law,148 then allowing
a mistaken belief concerning the meaning of a law to excuse should have
no greater adverse effect.
Further, if a mistaken belief of law is blameworthy, in that the average
community member or professional would have learned the meaning of
the law, the erroneous belief should not excuse criminal conduct even if
ig-norantia legis is narrowed to reflect its proper basis. 149 A requirement
that mistake not be blameworthy substantially limits the number of cases
in which mistake could excuse. Certainly a professional knowing of the
existence of a law concerning his profession might be thought adequately
forewarned to find out its meaning and, if that meaning is unclear, to
regulate his actions so as to avoid possible illegality. When the defendant
144. For a discussion of the difference between ignorance and mistake, see Keedy,
supra note 4, at 76.
145. J. Hall, supra note 5, at 15-16.
146. Id. at 18.
147. Id. at 19. Hall said that the alternative to use of ignorantia legis would be abandonment of the rule of law. Id. at 23, 44.
148. Cf. notes 82-84 supra & accompanying text.
149. See notes 140-43 supra & accompanying text.
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claiming mistake of law knows of the existence and basic meaning of the
statute but allegedly believes his conduct did not violate the law, the
doctrine of ignorantialegis could not be used to convict him, nor would
limiting that doctrine absolve him of liability. Unless his belief negated
a required intent, the defendant will be held to answer for his act; if
he acted voluntarily with knowledge of the law and that act is found to
violate the law, the defendant's intent to violate the law could be inferred. 150 Hall's argument, that allowing mistake of law to excuse would
destroy the legal system, thus does not support ignorantialegis.
CONCLUSION

Although the doctrine still receives widespread judicial and academic
adherence, retention of ignorantia legis is unnecessary to effective enforcement of the criminal laws and, in many cases, is inconsistent with
the bodies of law that prevent punishment for acts declared criminal
ex post facto and that void statutes for vagueness. In its general application, the doctrine is both inefficacious and unjust. Additionally, accept150. This statement may be qualified if the law violated was not drawn with sufficient
clarity for the defendant to have been able to know its terms or if the law was not
reasonably available to the defendant. Of course, the former requirement, under its
designation as the vagueness doctrine, already has been recognized as one of major
constitutional proportions. See notes 18-28 supra & accompanying text. The latter
requirement was recognized implicitly by the Supreme Court in Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945). See also The Cotton Planter, 6 F. Cas. 620, 621-23 (No. 3,270)
(C.C.N.Y. 1810).
Criminal prosecutions arising out of the "Watergate" scandal have given rise to
extensive, and not entirely coherent, judicial discussion of the effect of mistake of law.
In United States v. Barker, No. 74-1883 (D.C. Cir., May 17, 1976), a three-judge panel
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued opinions with
three different views of the applicable impact of mistake of law. All three opinions
merged mistake and ignorance of the law; all three conceded that ignorance of the
law as a general rule does not excuse; all three admitted to some injustice in the rule;
and each suggested a different solution to ease its harshness. The defendants in
Barrker knew of the existence of the relevant law, but incorrectly believed their actions
to have been authorized by a person with legal authority to do so. The judges sought
to determine whether that mistake was legal or factual and whether it fit within one
of the exceptions to the rule that mistake of law does not excuse. Although the judges
attempted to create categories of excusable mistake, mistake of law has been allowed
to excuse only if it negates a required intent or if the law was not sufficiently clear
or sufficiently accessible to satisfy due process-that is, if some other legal doctrine
provided a defense. See examples of excusable mistake, id. at 19-26 (Leventhal, J.,
dissenting). The difficulties of the decisions could have been eased had analysis been
in terms of the blameworthiness of defendants' mistake. Although much in the opinions
indicates a leaning toward similar concepts, see id. at 11-13, 20-22 (Wilkey, J.), 1-4
(Merhige, J.), 16-26 (Leventhal, J., dissenting), straightforward analysis depends on
rejection of ignorantia legis.
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ance of ignorantialegis has produced inconsistencies in vagueness cases
and in decisions concerning mens rea. Of the many arguments advanced
to support ignwrantia legis, none justifies the breadth of that doctrine,
and only one provides a persuasive reason for not allowing ignorance to
excuse in all cases: there are circumstances in which ignorance of the
law is blameworthy.
In such circumstances, there is neither unfairness nor inefficacy in
punishing a defendant for the underlying crime. The result is not unfair
because the defendant's conduct, with regard both to every element of
the crime and to his failure to learn of the illegality of the act, is blameworthy. Nor is the imposition of punishment in these circumstances
inconsistent with the concepts of fairness embodied in the ex post facto
prohibition and due process guarantees of the Constitution. These provisions demand that no defendant be convicted absent a reasonable
expectation that he knew, at the time of his offending action, what was
necessary to conform his conduct to the legally-mandated standard.
When a defendant's ignorance is itself culpable, by definition the test of
fair treatment embodied in those constitutional provisions has been met
because culpability, at a minimum, is the failure to do that which a
reasonable, prudent man of average intelligence would. The test is altered
from case to case only insofar as the standard applicable to a defendant
may be higher than that imposed on other community members, such as
a defendant professional whose conduct should be judged against the
normal behavior of his fellow professionals. Judging culpability by these
standards, it is efficacious as well as just to punish a person whose ignorance of the law is blameworthy. Because the defendant has failed to learn
of the law governing his endeavor, and consequently has violated that
law, it is evident that he has adopted a standard of care below that
reasonably expected by society; thus, the defendant's unimpeded pursuit
of that endeavor presents an unacceptable hazard to the public.
If there is only one area in which application of ignoranltia legis is
justified, it would be far better to abandon the doctrine and start anew
than to preserve it and attempt to limit the maxim to its proper scope.
To supplant ignoramntia legis, the following precept is advanced: no
person shall be convicted of any crime who, at the time of the allegedly
offending action, was unaware that his actions were criminal, excepting
only those persons whose ignorance is blameworthy. Under this rubric,
a defendant who sought to avoid liability could plead his ignorance in
defense. It is of little moment whether the defendant is required initially
to produce evidence of his ignorance or instead is allowed simply to plead
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ignorance and await the prosecution's production of contrary evidence.
The likely access of a defendant to facts respecting his ignorance and
notions of judicial economy favor placing the burden of going forward
on the defendant. In any event, the burden of proof would remain with
the government.' 5 ' Faced with a plea of ignorance, the prosecution
would be required to introduce evidence showing either that the defendant was in fact not ignorant of the law making his conduct criminal or
that a reasonable, prudent man (or reasonable, prudent professional if
regulation of an occupation is involved) would have been aware of it.
As with any proposed alteration of the law, two issues remain: by
what power the change can be effected and what impact will the change
have on the disposition of criminal prosecutions. Neither question poses
significant problems for abandonment of ignorantialegis. The ignorantia
legis doctrine exists in most American jurisdictions, including federal
law, solely by judicial fiat; courts do not require legislative direction to
limit the punishment of ignorant offenders. Courts are not free to create
defenses to statutory crimes at will, but extensive areas of the criminal
law long have been the exclusive province of judicial construction.
These encompass matters such as the extent to which an insane delusion
negates a required intent, the precise definition of intent called for by
the usually imprecise terms used to indicate an intent requirement,
and, as in Morissette v. United States, 52 the circumstances under which
an intent requirement will be inferred in the absence of legislative
language creating or expressly negating the requirement. With the possible exception of a few comprehensive criminal codes like that enacted
by Illinois,' z' these areas remain open to judicial creativity. In the absence
of clear legislative direction to the contrary, judges may determine independently that the ignorantialegis doctrine no longer merits obeisance.
The concept of judicial power to ensure the fairness of judicial
processes is not new, as is evidenced by Justice Livingston's decision in
The Cotton Planter'5 4 more than a century and a half ago. A decision
that nonculpable ignorance of the law should excuse setms as much
within the bounds of judicial power as a decision that a law cannot take
151. In this respect, knowledge of the law would be treated as a rebuttable presumption. This approach avoids violating the Tot-Leary proscription against irrebuttable
presumptions in such cases. See notes 133-39 stupra & accompanying text.
152. 342 U.S. 246 (1952). See notes 53-56 supra & accompanying text.
153. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §5 4-1 to -9 (1973).
154. 6 F. Cas. 620 (No. 3,270) (C.C.N.Y. 1810). See note 110 supra & accompanying
text.
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effect until a copy has been received in the particular locale concerned," 5'
or that statements should be excluded from evidence because obtained
during an extended period of detention prior to arraignment' 56 or by
means constitutionally forbidden to federal officers. 57 The use of
"supervisory" judicial powers to adopt the precept that blameless ignorance of the law should prevent criminal liability offers one basis to
abandon ignorantialegis. The supervisory powers of the judiciary have
been guided by a concept of fairness closely related to that embodied in
the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments; these
provisions supply the constitutional power that may be relied upon as
an alternative basis for abrogating ignoraotia legis. The due process
guarantees require prosecutors to divulge information to defense
counsel'58 and to prohibit imposition of criminal sanctions against one
who had no knowledge of the illegality of her "wholly passive"
conduct.'5 9 Due process is even versatile enough to guarantee the right
to privacy' 60 and the right to travel. 16' Certainly the concept of due
process would not have to be stretched unduly to encompass judicial
construction of a right for persons blamelessly ignorant of the law to
escape criminal sanction.
Similarly, such an abandonment of ignorantia legis would have no
dramatic impact on law enforcement. Its direct effect on the broad
range of criminal prosecutions is likely to be minor. The change will
have no impact on prosecutions for heinous crimes; defendants ignorant
of the illegality of acts satisfying the definitions of these crimes generally
will not possess the requisite sanity for conviction. Instead, abrogation
of the maxim is most likely to affect prosecutions for more esoteric
155. 6 F. Cas. at 621-23.
156. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The McNabb decision, based
on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over federal courts and prosecutors,
later was reaffirmed on the basis of rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). The Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 701, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3502 (1970), subsequently provided a different standard for judging the admissibility of the contested class of statements.
157. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For a discussion of the supervisory
power invoked in Weeks, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-33 (1949), and Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-56 (1961).
158. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See Comment, Brady v. Maryland and
the Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 112 (1972).
159. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1957).
160. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
161. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
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crimes, 62 allowing acquittal if a defendant is prosecuted for an action
6
that he did not know, and had no reason to know, to be criminal.
Acquittal in such cases is sometimes secured by a determined court, but
only at the expense of compounding the illogic of the criminal law, as
was done in Lambert v. California.16 Absent the need to harmonize
such decisions with ignorantialegis, the structure of protections against
misuse of the criminal sanction can be recast as a more coherent whole;
the various limitations affected by ignorantialegis may be analyzed more
freely, and a more logical, consistent, and fair body of law will emerge.
One defender of ignorantialegis concluded that considerations of the
public welfare demanded adherence to the maxim even though "[m]ere
logic would seem to indicate that the maxim should be abrogated
entirely." 165 This rule of illogic has continued long enough. Ignorantia
legis, as presently construed, should be set aside by the courts as a quaint
relic of the times when neighbors knew each other, citizens were familiar
with the criminal laws, and crimes required criminal intent.

162. See notes 127-28 supra & accompanying text.

163. Such cases most frequently arise as the result either of attempts to enforce new
and scantly publicized measures or of sporadic efforts to enforce old and seldom
utilized statutes. In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), for example, it was noted
that between enactment of the legislation in 1879 and Poe in 1961, only. one prosecution,
State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940), had been initiated under the Con-

necticut law against dissemination of contraceptives. 367 U.S. at 501.See also United
States v. Freeman, No. 75-2183

(4th Cir., Mar. 4, 1976), affirming a conviction for

violation of a regulation banning parking in certain areas. Despite the absence of a sign
to indicate that parking was proscribed, the court, noting that a regulation had been
published in the Code of Federal Regulations, (which runs approximately 60,000 pages),
see H.R. Rep. No. 94-104, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976),

declared that publication

gave sufficient warning to the defendant that his action was illegal.
164. 355 U.S. 225 (1957). See notes 77-78 supra& accompanying text.
165. Perkins, supra note 6, at 40.

